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RULE OF LAW, STANDARDS OF LAW,
DISCRETION AND TRANSPARENCY
RULE OF LAW SYMPOSIUM ISSUE IN
HONOR OF JOHN ATTANASIO
Eleanor M. Fox*
I. INTRODUCTION
RULE of law connotes democracy, equity, and efficiency. It im-plies that people are governed by law, not (arbitrary) man or wo-man. It connotes that people in the same circumstances are
governed by the same rules. And it suggests a degree of certainty and
predictability, facilitating the economic transactions that ultimately pro-
vide our bread or tacos, internet connections, and data transmittal that
increase peoples’ standards of living and make society better off. John
Attanasio has spent his illustrious career facilitating the rule of law, and it
is a pleasure to write this essay in his honor.
This essay reflects on the economic and market side of rule of law,
particularly as applied to antitrust (or competition) law. Law is not all
rules; economic law is often, if not usually, composed of standards. Stan-
dards usually entail a formula or paradigm. The same standard applied by
two different people—for example, to determine if conduct or a merger is
anticompetitive—can yield different results. The identically worded stan-
dard applied by individuals in two different countries is even more likely
to yield different results. And an economic standard embellished by a
public interest or industrial policy factor is yet more likely to yield differ-
ent results. What does this flexibility mean for rule of law? Does it sug-
gest that we need clearer, more stable, less flexible standards? Does it
suggest that “public interest” and “industrial policy” should be jettisoned
from competition analysis? I shall answer no and shall consider the limits
within which standards meet the requirements of “rule of law.” I use the
example of monopoly and merger law, and I contrast approaches of the
United States, the European Union, China, and South Africa. I argue
that nations appropriately have flexibility to give the same word—such as
“anticompetitive”—different meanings, and that they appropriately have
flexibility to tailor their laws in their own national interests, at least when
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they have regard for conflicting interests of other systems. The ideal of
“rule of law in the world” should not push nations to adopt less flexible
standards than they choose (and indeed one can hardly imagine jurists
doing so). When nations and their agents carry out their assessments
thoughtfully and transparently, against a backdrop of articulated stan-
dards, they satisfy the appropriate requirements of rule of law. But when
the authorities obscure strategic maneuvers and forsake application of a
standard-of-law paradigm in favor of a strategy to impose costs on other
nations and their enterprises, they violate the soft norm of rule of law.
II. SOME BOUNDS OF RULE OF LAW
This essay is about standards, discretion, and compatibility with rule of
law, using competition law as a window for exploration. Standards are by
definition less certain than rules.1 In competition law, or antitrust, there is
a rule against cartels.2 This is a clear rule, especially in the United States,
and it has become increasingly clear and its limits increasingly well-de-
fined in the various other antitrust jurisdictions of the world. Business
people know that if they join a price-fixing cartel and they are caught,
they risk high fines and jail.3
As for mergers, there is a standard.4 What is anticompetitive may be
determined by applying the standard.5 Normally the standard is: does the
merger create market power to the harm of consumers?6 This is a ques-
tion of antitrust economics. Antitrust economics is not a science. Econo-
mists build models on the basis of assumptions; assumptions, for example,
as to how well markets work to check market power. Within a single
country, such as the United States, one economist’s assumptions are usu-
ally fairly close to other economists’ assumptions, but not always. Moreo-
ver, assumptions and therefore results can be affected by values and
preferences. For example, people, who may be judges, who worry about
growing economic power might put a thumb on the scale against large
concentrations (such as the now pending merger of Time Warner and
Comcast),7 and those who worry about intrusive government and trust
business decisions to be efficient might put a thumb on the scale in favor
of freedom to merge.
Antitrust law also entails a law against monopolization (United
1. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 559–60 (1992).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
3. See id.




7. Cecilia Kang, Comcast, Time Warner Agree to Merger in $45 Billion Deal, WASH.
POST, Feb. 13, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/comcast-time-war
ner-agree-to-merger-in-45-billion-deal/2014/02/1307b778d60-9469-11e3-84cl-27626c53f5fb_
story.html.
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States)8 or abuse of dominance (European Union).9 A complicated set of
rules and standards in the United States, European Union, and elsewhere
informs whether the rules and standards are violated, and those rules and
standards are constantly evolving. Notwithstanding a target that moves
within a margin, huge fines may result from a violation.10
To complicate the problem of predictability, some nations’ laws include
public interest or national interest as factor for assessment.11 Some of
these laws spell out the admissible interests, such as jobs and effect on
small business;12 others do not.
I begin with the category of monopolization/abuse of dominance, with-
out the complication of public interest, and compare the law of the
United States and the law of the European Union; I proceed to the cate-
gory of mergers and public interest and compare South Africa and China;
then I conclude.
As background, I observe that competition law problems frequently
span the world. What a firm does in New York may be felt in China and
Africa. A merger of firms in the European Union may affect consumers
in Sydney or Tokyo. All things being equal, the world community has an
interest in the application of the same or similar rules and standards
across the world, for ease of transactions, predictability, saving costs, in-
ducing investments, and increasing standards of living. The divergence of
standards is not a sin against rule of law. But does arbitrary and differen-
tial application, or unknowability of the law, violate the soft norm?
A. MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
I examine, here, examples from the law of the United States and the
European Union.
The law of the United States and the law of the European Union re-
garding the conduct of a dominant firm are quite divergent. Both sets of
laws purport to be for the consumer.13 But the bodies of law entail differ-
ent presumptions, and often the authorities and jurists reach different re-
sults on the same facts.14 What is illegal in the United States as
anticompetitive is almost surely illegal in the EU, but what is illegal in the
EU as anticompetitive may well be legal in the United States and might
even be encouraged as pro-competitive.15
The poster child pairs of cases are Trinko and LinkLine in the United
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
9. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 102, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TFEU].
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
11. See, e.g., Competition Act of Republic of South Africa of 1998 § 124.
12. See id.
13. See Eleanor Fox, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance: Why Europe is Differ-
ent, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 129, 135 (2014).
14. See id. at 136–39.
15. See id.
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States, and Deutsche Telekom andTeliaSonera in the European Union.16
In the United States, a dominant firm has the right to use its leverage to
deprive competitors of important opportunities while in the European
Union the dominant firm has a special responsibility not to do so. Moreo-
ver, in both the United States and the European Union, there are areas of
the law that are unsettled and constantly evolving, and running afoul of
the law may cost more than a billion dollars, as Intel can testify.17 The
different results may be driven by different values, usually unstated, but
there is no suggestion (at least not usually) that the different results are
driven by discrimination against outsiders.
B. MERGERS
In merger antitrust cases, authorities and jurists must determine
whether a merger is anticompetitive. We concentrate here on public and
national interest factors. In some jurisdictions, as in China, the factors to
consider in deciding whether a merger is anticompetitive include these
elements.18 Specifically, in China, the factors to be considered include the
effect on the development of the national economy,19 and the expressed
purposes of the antitrust statute include protecting the consumer and
public interests, and “promoting the healthy development of the socialist
market economy.”20 In other jurisdictions, such as South Africa, public
interests are identified separately from competition interests. In South
Africa, public interest factors include advancing the interests of histori-
cally discriminated against people, jobs, and small business.21 In South
Africa the competition authorities are empowered to prevent a pro-com-
petitive merger for public interest reasons, and they may authorize an
anticompetitive merger for public interest reasons.22
The highest profile public interest merger in South Africa is Wal-Mart’s
acquisition of Massmart. The merger was not anticompetitive, but it was
perceived as a threat to jobs, workers, and small business suppliers. The
public interest aspects and effects were tried before the Competition Tri-
bunal, with advocates for all sides and concerns being heard. Ultimately,
the Tribunal allowed the merger with conditions, notably including the
creation of a fund by Wal-Mart dedicated to building the capacity of the
small South African suppliers to enable them to be part of the global
16. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009); Verizon
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Case C-52/09,
Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 E.C.R. 527; Case C-280/08P, Deutsche
Telekom AG v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-9555.
17. See Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, 2014 E.C.R. 472, available at cu-
ria.europa.edu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-286/09.
18. See Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) art. 1.
19. Id. art. 27(5).
20. Id. art. 1.
21. See The Competition Act of Republic of South Africa of 1998 § 12A.
22. Id. Competition Comm’n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2012 110/CAC/Jun11 (S. Afr.).
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value chain.23 On appeal the court required a more exacting determina-
tion of how much money was needed to build the capacity and how the
fund would carry out its training responsibilities.24
In China, mergers are vetted by MOFCOM, the Ministry of Com-
merce.25 As of February 2014, more than 700 mergers had been vetted by
MOFCOM.26 All but twenty-two have been cleared without conditions.27
Of the twenty-two, two were prohibited.28 The first was Coca Cola’s ac-
quisition of juice company Huiyuan,29 a merger that was not anticompeti-
tive (i.e., did not create market power) by most contemporary Western
competition analyses.30 Of the twenty mergers on which MOFCOM im-
posed conditions, nearly half were subject to conditions that were not
easily recognized by Western experts as protecting competition, and in
some cases the conditions appeared to significantly reduce the merger’s
efficiencies. For example, to clear its acquisition of Yihaodian, Wal-Mart
agreed not to use the online platform of its merger partner, the biggest
online supermarket in China,31 and in the case of some mergers such as
Xstrata/Glencore,32 despite the improbability of anticompetitive effects,
MOFCOM imposed conditions that would assure China a source of sup-




25. Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, MOFCOM Holds a Special
Press Conference on Anti-monopoly, Mar. 4, 2014, available at english.mofan.gov.cn/article/
newsrelease/press/201403/20140300507466.shtml.
26. Peter Wang, Sebastien Evard & Yizhe Zhang, Antitrust Alert: China Moves To-
wards an Expedited Review for Mergers but Leaves Details Unclear, JONES DAY (Feb. 24,
2014), http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert-china-moves-towards-an-expedited-review-
for-mergers-but-leaves-details-unclear-02-24-2014.
27. Yuni Yan Sobel, Domestic-to-Domestic Transactions—A Gap in China’s Merger
Control Regime?, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2014, available at http://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/feb14_sobel_2_20f.authcheckdam.pdf.
28. Fay Zhai, Yuan Cheng & Renan Flanagan, MOFCOM Issues Second Ever Prohibi-
tion Decision and Publishes New Merger Notification Guidance, LINKLATERS (June 2014),
http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/mkt/beying/latest_mofcom_developments_alert_june_2014
.pdf.
29. Andrew Batson, China’s Statement Blocking Coca-Cola Huiyuan Deal, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 18, 2009 at 6:58 a.m.), blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/03/18/china’s-statement-
blocking-coca-cola-huiyan-deal.
30. The second was a big shipping joint venture which MOFCOM treated as a merger.
See Simon Baxter, Frederic Depoortere, Ingrid Vandenborre, & Andrew Foster, Navigat-
ing Chinese Merger Control: MOFCOM Prohibits P3 Shipping Alliance, SKADDEN (June
19, 2014), http://www.skadden.com/insights/navigating-chinese-merger-control-mofcom-
prohibits-p3-shipping-alliance.
31. Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, Announcement No. 49, 2012
on Approval of Decision Made Upon Anti-Monopoly Review on Concentration of Opera-
tors for Purchasing 336% Equity of Niuhai Holdings by Wal-Mart with Restrictive Condi-
tions (promulgated, Aug. 13, 2012).
32. See Thomas Jones & Jessica Qiu, What Do China’s MOFCOM’s Recent Merger
Clearance Decisions Mean for You?, CORRS.COM (May 13, 2014), http://www.corrs.com.au/
thinking/insights/what-do-china-s-mofcom-s-recent-merger-clearance-decisions-mean-for-
you.
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III. ASSESSMENT
Cartel law is the antitrust law closest to a rule and closest to a rule for
the world. As for the law governing abuse of dominance, there is signifi-
cant divergence in the world and even a significant margin in which the
law is not predictable within a single jurisdiction. This state of the law
gives room for policy choices by the decision-maker on a case-by-case
basis. As for merger law, the articulated standard is quite similar through-
out the world. It is often identically or nearly identically applied, except
for applications in China. China purports to apply competition standards
neutrally, despite suspicions to the contrary. A number of jurisdictions
expressly authorize or require consideration of public interest factors, es-
pecially in merger assessments. South Africa is a good example of a coun-
try that applies public interest factors transparently and with openness
and due process to all stakeholders.
Rule of law does not mean that law across nations should be uniform.
It does not mean that the law should be all rules and no standards, and it
does not mean that the rule or standard should be written in stone. Flexi-
bility where multiple factors are relevant to wise decision-making is a
healthy quality of a free and vital society. But rule of law does imply
transparency, access to knowledge of what the law is, metrics to predict
what it is becoming, nondiscriminatory and non-arbitrary application of
principles and formulae, and consciousness that we live in a world com-
munity and have a responsibility not to impose costs on our neighbors
without justifications that would stand up in the court of
cosmopolitanism.
There is a constant drumbeat in the West that China violates these
principles.33 Even so, one must be impressed by China’s amazing strides
in applying international principles of competition law. The glass is at
least half full, not half empty. In competition law, the state of the world in
applying rule of law is, in general, strong.34
33. See Keith Bradsher, No longer Business as Usual in China, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2014 at B1. See also D. Daniel Sokol, Merger Control Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law,
10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1 (2013)
34. Convergence is facilitated by three international bodies—the International Com-
petition Network, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. See Eleanor Fox, John Fingleton,
& Sophia Mitchell, The Past and Future of International Antitrust: Gaps, Overlaps and The
Institutional Challenge, in BUILDING NEW COMPETITION LAW REGIMES, 163 (David Lewis
ed., 2013).
